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International Law's Response To The New 
International Economic Order: An Overview* 
by John King Gamble,Jr.** 
and Maria Frankowska*** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The New International Economic Order [hereinafter the NIEO] has received 
a substantial amount of scholarly attention especially in the last decade. Impor-
tant features of the NIEO, such as the way it can bear on almost any aspect of 
international law or international relations, are indistinct. One must exercise 
extreme care lest discussions and analyses be imprecisely focused and completely 
open-ended. A principal way the article attempts to overcome this tendency is 
to concentrate on the international legal aspects of the NIEO.' Due regard is 
given to the views of Western states, Socialist states, and the Less Developed 
Countries (LDCs). The NIEO as a developing global regime2 can be created 
only with the consent of these three major groups of actors on the international 
scene. 
A. Are There Historical Antecedents of the NIEO? 
Only since 1970 has the NIEO come to the fore in international law and 
relations. Nevertheless, it is important to the understanding of the NIEO to ask 
about its historical roots. But caution must be exercised. It is common for the 
literature to attribute NIEO significance to classical (pre-World War II) actions 
when often it is problematical whether such intent existed. One must remain 
cognizant of the fact that only very recently have the LDCs enjoyed the political 
power necessary to press their case for an NIEO. After all, most LDCs did not 
• The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of Denise Druhot (Southern Illinois Univer-
sity School of Law, 1986), in editing this article . 
.. Professor of Political Science, Behrend College. Pennsylvania State University . 
... Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law. 
, K. HOSSAIN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1980); LEGAL PROB-
LEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (N. Horn, ed. 1980). 
2 For an intriguing discussion of regimes, see Young, International Regimes: Problems of Concept 
Formation. 32 WORLD POLITICS 331 (1980); 36 INT'L ORG. (1982) (entire issue devoted to International 
Regimes). 
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exist as independent states until after 1950. Ellis in his recent study begins his 
discussion of the NIEO's history with the end of World War IJ.3 
In this discussion, only the inter-war period will be dealt with, since there was 
little NIEO activity before 1914 and the post-1945 period is better known and 
dealt with elsewhere in this piece. Meagher4 provides an excellent treatment of 
the history of the NIEO. Although the League of Nations Covenant makes few 
specific references to economic matters,5 a number of the agencies set up under 
the auspices of the League had important (and unexpected) economic impli-
cations.6 While it is true that the creation and development of the International 
Labour Organisation (lLO) are significant achievements in international eco-
nomic cooperation, most of the work of the ILO does not bear directly on the 
NIEO. 
During the inter-war period, the World Economic Conference, held in May, 
1927, was the impetus behind important changes in the international economic 
system: 
The effect of the Conference recommendations on members' policy 
was twofold. First, a number of bilateral treaties committing the 
signatories [sic] to the reduction of tariff barriers were concluded. 
Second, a Conference on Import and Export Prohibitions, specifi-
cally concerned with the elimination of trade barriers, was held in 
October 1927. Unlike the earlier Conference in May, this was an 
official meeting aimed at the drafting of a formal treaty. By July 
1928, 29 states had signed the Convention for the Abolition of 
Import and Export Prohibitions, obliging them to abolish existing 
prohibitions and restrictions on exports and imports and to refrain 
from imposing new ones. However, the Convention failed to receive 
a sufficient number of signatories for ratification.7 
This points out a very important feature of most of these precursors of the 
NIEO, to wit, most are primarily attempts to develop the original or "old" 
international economic order to which the NIEO is a reaction. One must have 
an order before having a new order, but it may be unrealistic to look for direct 
antecedents to the NIEO. The NIEO, after all, could not gain momentum until 
the basic issue of special treatment for the LDCs was ripe politically. This did 
not occur until about 1970. 
3 Ellis, The New International Economic Order And General Assembly Resolutions: The Debate Over The Legal 
Effects a/General Assembly Resolutions Revisited, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 651 (1985). 
4 R. MEAGHER, AN INTERNATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND POWER - A STUDY OF THE 
CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES (1979). 
SId. at 9. 
6Id. 
7Id. at 11. 
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The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) of 
1964 was the most significant event preceding the adoption of the NIEO "con-
stitutional" documents of 1974. This Conference, which saw the emergence of 
the Group of 77, established UNCTAD as a permanent body directly responsible 
to the U.N. General Assembly and entrusted with promoting the economic 
interests of the LDCs. The establishment of UNCT AD urged by the LDCs, was 
opposed by the developed Western states, but supported by the Socialist bloc.s 
The Final Act of UNCTAD I contained 15 General Principles and 13 Special 
Principles relating to economic cooperation and was supported by the Socialist 
states. Failure to focus the LDCs' demands for economic assistance solely on the 
West, however, resulted in the abstention of the Socialist states on many of the 
resolutions included therein. 9 
B. Towards a Definition of the NIEO 
The current status of the NIEO can be better understood by examining the 
goals of the NIEO. Most scholars would agree with Kreinin and Finger who 
discern four main objectives: (1) increasing LDCs' control over their economic 
destiny; (2) accelerating the LDCs' growth rate; (3) tripling the share of global 
industrial production conducted in the LDC by the year 2000; and (4) narrowing 
the gap in per capita income between the developed and developing countries. 10 
Socialist doctrine on the NIEO provides a different set of goals emphasizing 
the political rather than the economic aspects. The Soviet scholar, B.S. Fomin, 
states that "[T]he NIEO movement reflects a new state in the world process of 
national liberation, characterized by the completion of the struggle of the de-
veloping states for political independence, and by the focusing of their efforts 
on the problem of gaining economic independence."ll At the same time, Fomin 
stresses that the NIEO must be more than relations between the haves and the 
have nots. The specific interests of the Socialist states must be given just consid-
eration. I2 
While both Western and Socialist sets of goals are helpful to an understanding 
of the NIEO, to say nothing of the methods that will be employed or, for that 
matter, about the role, if any, that international law might play in progressing 
toward these goals. There seems to be considerable uncertainty, perhaps even 
8 For the explanation of the Socialist position, see Proceedings of UNCTAD I, vol. II, at 535 (1964). 
See also infra note 145. 
9 Id., vol. I at 80. 
10 Kreinin & Finger, A Critical Sumey of the New International Economic Order, 10 J. WORLD TRADE L. 
493 (1976). 
II B. Fomin, The New International Order as Viewed in the CMEA Countries, in EAST EUROPE AND THE 
NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 7 (E. Laszlo & J. Kuntzman, eds. 1980). 
12Id. at 7. See also Makarczyk & Wasilkowski, Le nouvel ordre economique international en tant qu 
instrument de transformation du droit international, XII POLISH Y.B. INT'L L. 41-55 (1983). 
260 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. IX, No.2 
uneasiness, about how international law relates to the NIEO. Some scholars 
would give international law a secondary position. For example, Correan wrote, 
"International law plays only a secondary role in this new economic order 
because of states' sovereignty."13 
Often, the primary importance of international law is assumed, but specific 
attempts to apply international law raise doubts. Professor Lillich's discussion is 
a good example: 
Basic to the creation of a new international economic order - an 
objective receiving near-unanimous support at the Sixth Special 
Session of the UN General Assembly held in the spring of 1974-
is international law. Surprisingly, in the welter of economic, social 
and political claims during the past year, legal considerations have 
had little impact. What does international law say about economic 
coercion? What substantive norms and procedural devices can it 
recommend as models for the restructuring process now going on 
so haphazardly and at such cost? Does it have any role to play at 
al\?14 
In the context of the NIEO, Third World doctrine challenges the fundamen-
tal premises of international law. The Algerian author and, presently, judge on 
the International Court of Justice, Mohammed Bedjaoui, put the matter this 
way: "[t]he establishment of a new economic order ... calls for changes in legal 
techniques, since these techniques have shown that they frequently serve only 
to perpetuate economic domination by a minority of States and make the 
possibility of transformations remote."15 Although one would expect Western 
scholarship to take issue with Judge Bedjaoui, the Socialist view as expressed 
by a leading Soviet scholar, G. Tunkin, is not receptive to the doctrine either. 
The Soviets reason that contemporary international law, created with the par-
ticipation of the Socialist states, is progressive and well-equipped to accommo-
date the reforms envisaged by the NIEO.16 One of the most lucid explanations 
ofthe Third World perspective ofthe NIEO is provided by F.V. Garcia-Amador. 
Dr. Garcia-Amador believes that tracing the roots of the NIEO to the European 
bases of international law has been overdone. 17 More important is the fact "that 
economic and political conditions have changed so substantially in recent de-
13 Correan, Le nouvel ordre economique international, 104 J. DU DROIT INT'L 595 (1977). 
14 R. LILLICH, ECONOMIC COERCION AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 75 (1976). 
15 M. BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 134 (1979). 
16 Tunkin, 0 miezdunarodno-pravovyh principah novogo miezdunarodnogo economicheskogo poriadka, 9 Sov-
ETSKOJE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO 95 (1980) [On International Legal Principles of the New International 
Economic Order (Soviet State and Law, Moscow)]. But see Makarczyk & Wasilkowski, supra note 12, at 
45-50. 
17 Garcia-Amador, The Proposed New International Economic Order: A New Approach to the Law Governing 
Nationalization and Compensation, 12 LAW. AM. 5 (1980). 
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cades that the traditional principles and rules are no longer relevant to their 
way of life."18 
Formulating a definition of the NIEO is complicated by the fact that the term 
itself may be misleading; the NIEO is surely not exclusively economic in na-
ture. 19 The political and emotional dimensions of the NIEO are well known 
and expressed succinctly by Ali Mazrui's description that the LDCs are "caught 
between the indignity of charity and the ambition of economic justice."20 A 
route to definition taken by Professor Gillian White dissects the component 
words of the New International Economic Order in order to arrive at its mean-
ing. Having many shades of meaning, the word "order" can be a description of 
the "way things normally happen."21 Citing Schwartzenberger, White states: 
"[Order is] a state of affairs, characterized by the effective control of those 
subject to such a system by an essential factual rather than normative ... 
apparatus of force and power .... "22 Using a rigorous definition of "order" 
may lead to the conclusion that the NIEO is more an ideology or "pseudo-
order," not actually a de facto or de jure order.23 
The interpretations given to the words "economic," "international," and "new" 
are less varied, but are still open to several interpretations. "Economic" as 
generally used in NIEO discussions is far different from the narrow, academic 
denotative definition of the word. In effect, the term can include almost any 
economic activity.24 "International" is also used in the broadest possible sense 
including both regional and global aspects. 25 Furthermore, "international" is 
broader than "inter-state," because it pertains to a whole range of relations at 
many different levels26 and includes many thorny questions attendant with 
private foreign investment in developing countries. The word "new" is both 
subjective and relative. Certain aspects of the NIEO do seem genuinely new 
while other components are traceable to the inter-war period. 
A more thorough examination of the NIEO must explore its international 
legal elements, a task undertaken in various reports prepared by the United 
Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). These reports have 
dealt comprehensively and rigorously with problems of definition. UNITAR's 
studies, not surprisingly, look to United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 
18Id. 
19Id. at 14. 
20 A. Mazrui, Panel Discussion on the New International Economic Order, in THE NEW INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC ORDER: THE NORTH-SOUTH DEBATE 371 (j. Bhagwati, ed. 1977). 
21 White, A New International Economic Order?, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 325 (1975-76). 
22 G. SCHWARZEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 6 (1971), cited in G. White, supra note 21, 
at 325. 
2' Id. at 326. 
24Id. 
25Id. 
26/d. at 327. 
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as the bases for the NIEO. The central document, the General Assembly'S 
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 
adopted by consensus, states: 
[The order] shall correct inequalities and redress existing injustices 
[and] ... eliminate the widening gap between the developed and 
developing countries .... [The order will give] preferential and 
non-reciprocal treatment for developing countries, in all fields of 
international economic cooperation wherever feasible, whenever 
possible [.]27 
The working definition adopted by UNITAR on this basis is a good one: 
Thus, NIEO law might tentatively be defined as: the agreed set of 
principles and rules on the basis of which a more just and equitable 
international economic order should be pursued.28 
Problems occur when one attempts to apply this definition. This is evident 
even in the UNITAR work itself which often takes an expansive view of what 
constitutes agreement to a "set of principles." Additionally, there is considerable 
state-to-state variation in perceptions of justice and equity. Nonetheless, UNI-
TAR's working definition provides a useful benchmark against which the legal 
aspects of the NIEO can be analyzed. 
C. Organization Adopted Here 
The influence of the NIEO is so pervasive in treaties, United Nations reso-
lutions, and declarations that it is impossible to deal with more than a small 
fraction of law contained in these instruments. UNITAR's exhaustive study of 
the subject found that: 
[D]uring the ten-year period of the Second UN Development De-
cade and the first two years of the Third one, the UN General 
Assembly has adopted 826 provisions, incorporated in 135 resolu-
tions, calling for preferential treatment of developing countries in 
12 major areas of economic cooperation. 29 
UNITAR's approach was to concentrate on the following four main sources 
(manifestations) of practice: 1) treaties and other written instruments; 2) inter-
pretations or applications of treaty provisions; 3) decisions of intergovernmental 
27 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, May 1, 1974, G.A. 
Res. 3201, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.1), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715, 716, 718 (1974). 
28 "Analytical Papers and Analysis of Texts of Relevant Instruments," Progressive Development of the 
Principles and Norms of International Law Relating to the New Economic Order, UNITARlDS/5, 15 Aug. 
1982, p. 11 (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as UNITAR]. 
29Id. at 9. 
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organizations; and 4) multilateral decisions taken outside the framework of an 
intergovernmental organization. 30 
In order to accommodate the variety of modes through which the NIEO may 
be advanced, this Article focuses on the following documents: (1) the Charter 
of Economic Rights and Duties of States (1974); (2) the Lima Declaration and 
Plan of Action on Industrial Development and Cooperation (1975); (3) the 
LOME II (1979) and LOME III (1984) Conventions; and (4) the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982). 
These documents were selected because (1) each addresses substantively im-
portant NIEO-relevant issues; (2) the documents represent various legal modes 
and operational levels; and (3) the documents span the epoch during which the 
NIEO has been developing most rapidly. These documents will provide a frame-
work for a broader, more theoretical discussion of the relationship between the 
NIEO and international law. 
In Part II of this Article, each of the documents is analyzed from several 
vantages. First, the relevant NIEO passages are summarized. Second, the legal 
force of the documents is assessed both in terms of breadth and authority of 
application. It is important to note the degree to which these represent mature 
law (droit mur) as opposed to immature law (droit vert).31 Where possible, views 
of Western, Socialist, and developing states are assessed. In Part III, the Article 
analyzes the international legal substance of the NIEO, discussing in particular 
the three principal sources of international law: treaties; custom; and general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations. Moreover, a scheme to evaluate 
the obligations created by NIEO-related documents is presented. Finally, in Part 
IV, the authors conclude that although international law should playa positive 
role in assisting LDCs under the rubric of the NIEO, it should do so cautiously 
and subtly. 
II. NIEO DOCUMENTS 
A. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 
1. Background and Context 
It is generally acknowledged that the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties 
of States32 [hereinafter cited as the Charter] is the most important document 
dealing with the NIEO; some compare it to a constitution of the NIEO. The 
Charter was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 12, 1974 by 
30 [d. at IS. 
3l [d. 
32 G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. Al9631 (1974) [here-
inafter cited as Charter], reprinted in 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 484 (1975) and 14 I.L.M. 251 (\975). 
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a vote of 120 for, 6 against, and 10 abstentions.33 The exact origin of the Charter 
is difficult to trace. The development of a large group of politically-aware LDCs 
was surely a necessary prerequisite. Reduced bipolarity in the international 
system34 and a new international situation where economic power takes prece-
dence over military power also contributed to the creation of this document. 35 
There is no doubt that Mexico was the prime mover behind efforts to create 
the Charter. President Luis Echeverria was involved personally in the matter. 
In addition, some of the basic documents were drafted by the Mexican Ministry 
of External Affairs.36 Mexico's Jorge Castaneda, subsequently Mexican Foreign 
Minister, was the most important person in the conduct of the negotiations that 
produced the Charter. As chairman of the Charter Working Group he intended 
that the Group "formulate an instrument setting out genuine authentic rights 
and duties of a juridical nature arising in economic relations between States."37 
As expected, developed countries found much lacking, both in the procedure 
and the resulting document. During the negotiations there were recurring and 
fundamental disagreements. Ambassador John Scali of the United States said 
the Group of 77 was "ramming through" its proposals and in the process might 
ruin the U.N. as a productive forum. 38 The LDCs' participants intended that 
the Charter be a legally binding document, but the U.S. expressed grave doubts 
about the "advisability, possibility or feasibility of making the rights and duties 
formulated in a draft Charter legally binding on States."39 These were also 
doubts shared by other Western countries.40 The Socialist states, with the ex-
ception of Romania, opposed a legally binding document. 41 
Early in the discussions, the exact wording of the title of the Charter was 
debated, with some states favoring "recommendation" and others "resolution."42 
Most states agreed that the Charter should be declarative of customary inter-
national law, but divergence existed about whether the Charter should break 
"Those voting against were Belgium, Denmark, Germany (FRG), Luxembourg, the United King-
dom, and the United States. Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Norway, and Spain abstained. See 14 I.L.M. 265 (1975). 
34 E. McWhinney, The International Law-Making Process and the New International Economic Order, 14 
CAN. V.B. INT'L L. 58 (1976). 
35 !d. at 60. 
'6 R. MEAGHER, supra note 4, at 37. 
'7 See the opening statement at the First Session of the Working Group on the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States-TD/B/AC.12/1 at 4. See also White, supra note 21, at 333. 
'8 J. Scali, U.N. Doc. A/PV/2229 (1974), reprinted in 70 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 569 (1974). 
'9Id. 
40 Brower & Tepe, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: A Reflection or Rejection of 
International Law?, 9 INT'L LAW. 300 (1975). 
41 See Bulgaria's and Hungary's position, TD/B/AC.12/1 at 5. Romania joined the Group of 77 in 
1964 and shared the Group's values on NIEO issues. 
42 Rozental, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the New International Economic Order, 
16 VA. J. INT'L L. 309, 314 (1975-76). 
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new legal ground. The LDCs maintained that the Charter should not only 
codify existing law but also contribute to its progressive development.43 While 
stating this goal before the Working Group on the Charter, at the beginning of 
the negotiations, Ambassador Castaneda was pragmatic enough to stress the 
need for the universality of the Charter. He was aware that in order to be a 
success "the Charter should be an instrument fundamentally acceptable to, or 
at least tolerated by, all the main groups of States."44 In addition, the LDCs 
generally believed that the Charter should have the development of new rules 
responsive to present and future needs of the international community as its 
primary objective.45 
In spite of the overwhelming approval of the Charter, an assessment of the 
document is difficult. The fact that more than two-thirds of the provisions were 
accepted by all participating states46 suggests a remarkable exercise in interna-
tional consensus building, but the importance of that other one-third can loom 
large. Among the most systemic of the issues is whether a NIEO necessarily 
implies a new international legal order, a position which the LDCs asserted 
emphatically. Most developed states rejected any such suggestion. At a more 
basic level, experts have remarked that the Charter fails to indicate which 
economic rights and duties of states are subject to internationallaw.47 
2. The Content of the Charter and Nature of Obligations Created 
An unavoidable first blush reaction to the Charter is that it creates relatively 
few firm obligations. The most prevalent syntactical strategy used in the Charter 
was to state a general, open-ended principle with which no one could disagree 
and then to modify the operation of that principle with the phrase, "especially 
developing countries."48 The raison d'etre of the Charter is given in the Preamble: 
[I]t is a fundamental purpose of this Charter to promote the estab-
lishment of the new international economic order, based on equity, 
sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and cooper-
43 As stated by Castaneda in his opening statement, supra note 37. 
44 [d. 
45 Rozental, supra note 42. at 314. 
46 [d. at 321. 
.7 Brower & Tepe. supra note 40. at 302. 
48 Charter. supra note 32. at Preamble. This approach is used at many points in the Charter. including 
these: 
The promotion by the entire international community of economic and social progress of 
all countries. [d. at Preamble. 
[PJromote the regular flow and access of all commercial goods traded at stable. remunerative 
and equitable prices. thus contributing to the equitable development of the world econ-
omy .... [d. at art. 6. 
[GJo-operate in the economic. social. cultural. scientific and technological fields for the 
promotion of economic and social progress throughout the world .... [d. at art. 9. 
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ation among all States, irrespective of their economic and social 
systems[. ]49 
One cannot imagine this sort of statement causing any difficulty for any state; 
neither does it create any concrete obligation. 
Article 2 of the Charter deals in specific terms with the economic rights and 
duties of states. Its subsection (2)(c) has created the most interest in foreign 
offices and the academic community alike. It provides that each state has a 
right: 
To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign prop-
erty in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the 
State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws 
and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers perti-
nent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a contro-
versy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State 
and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all 
States concerned that other peaceful means be sought on the basis 
of the sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the prin-
ciple of free choice of means.50 
This section accounts for most of the abstentions and negative votes received 
by the Charter. Much of the disagreement stems from the omission of an 
"adequate, just and prompt" compensation standard within the Charter.51 Fur-
thermore, no mention is made of the public purpose doctrine which contends 
that, in the absence of public utility or necessity, foreign property, rights and 
interests cannot be "taken."52 
Other reactions have been stronger. Brower and Tepe termed this clause an 
"utter rejection of international law .... "53 It is clear that the developed, market 
economy states would be extremely chary of the combination of optional com-
pensation ("should be paid") and leaving disputes about compensation exclu-
sively to the domestic jurisdiction of the host state. Article 2(2)(c) gives expres-
sion to ideas long advocated by the Socialist states. 54 The Socialist doctrine does 
not consider the relevant provisions as an innovation but rather an interpreta-
tion properly enlarging the principle of the sovereignty of states, an interpre-
tation consistent with general international law. 55 
49 [d. at Preamble. 
50 [d. at art. 2(2)(c) (emphasis added). 
51 UNITAR, supra note 28, at 335. 
52 Weston, The Charter Of Economic Rights And Duties Of States And The Deprivation Of Foreign-Owned 
Wealth, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 439 (1981). 
53 Brower & Tepe. supra note 40. at 305. 
54 See in particular UNITAR. supra note 28. at 330-40. 
55 Tunkin. supra note 16. at 91. 
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It is interesting to examine the widespread use of the nonobligatory word 
"should" throughout the Charter. Although such wording in Article 2(2)(c) is 
disadvantageous to the developed countries', in the majority of cases it is ben-
eficial. Listed below are several of the developed countries' obligations to the 
LDCs which have been tempered (or eliminated) by the use of the word 
"should": 
1. promote international scientific and technological cooperation and the 
transfer of technology .... 56 
2.extend, improve and enlarge the system of generalized non-reciprocal and 
non-discriminatory tariff preferences to the developing countries .... 57 
3.promoting increased net flows of real resources to the developing countries 
from all sources .... 58 
Since so much of the Charter is diluted by the use of "should," considerable 
significance accrues by default to those passages that create firmer obligations 
and rights. There are very few provisions that establish obligations or rights 
that are both firm and tangible. Article 5 assures that "[a]ll States have the right 
to associate in organizations of primary commodity producers .... "59 In addi-
tion to Article 2 (which has already been discussed), Article 14 is the best 
example of these obligations: 
Staters] shall take measures aimed at securing additional benefits for 
the international trade of developing countries so as to achieve a 
substantial increase in their foreign exchange earnings, the diver-
sification of their exports, the acceleration of the rate of growth of 
their trade, taking into account their development needs .... 60 
Even though the language adopted mandates action, the nature and extent of 
that action is left almost completely to the discretion of individual states, that 
is, the obligation is firm, but not very tangible. It is unlikely that this Charter 
provision would motivate states to alter their behavior. A likely result is lip 
service to Charter objectives, but little concrete effort.61 
On balance, several things stand out about the Charter. While 120 states voted 
in favor of it, the nonbinding nature of U.N. resolutions coupled with the fact 
56 Charter, supra note 32, at art. 13.2. 
57Id. at art. 18. 
58 Id. at art. 22. 
59Id. at art. 5. 
60Id. at art. 14. 
61 The case of Canada is typical: 
That Canadian response to the NIEO divides into theory and practice is not unusual - all 
states act differently from their promises - but with respect to the NIEO the divergence is 
particularly striking. Few industrialized countries have taken public stances as sympathetic to 
LOC positions as Canada, or have failed as badly to live up to them. 
M. Wignor, Canada and the New International Economic Order: Some Legal Implications, 20 CAN. V.B. INT'L 
L. 167 (1982). 
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that many important economic powers did not support the Charter, creates an 
anemic result. The situation is compounded by the vague and general nature 
of most of the obligations created by the Charter, obligations which tend to be 
neither firm nor tangible. In fact, it is arguable that the Charter creates no firm, 
tangible obligations for any state. Article 2(2)(c) perhaps comes closest to cre-
ating a firm right. That right, however, is one-sided and was rejected by most 
of the principal economic powers. 
B. The Lima Declaration and Plan of Action on Industrial Development and 
Cooperation 
1. Background and Content 
The Lima Declaration62 was adopted on March 26, 1975, by the Second 
Conference of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization. As a 
declaration produced by an international conference, the Lima Declaration has 
less legal force than a treaty, but the exact degree of its legal force is debatable. 
A delicate way of dealing with this issue is seen in Dorsey's assessment that the 
Lima Declaration "add[s] to the normative authority of previous statements 
attesting to the existence of a developing international law of cooperation in 
the sphere of economic rights and duties of states."63 Dorsey's point suggests a 
continuum of legal obligation with unqualified acceptance of a treaty at one 
extreme of the continuum. The Lima Declaration represents some movement 
toward the treaty end of that continuum. 
The Declaration was accepted by the vast majority of participating states. 
Eighty-two voted in favor; only the United States cast a negative vote. Belgium, 
Canada, Germany (FRG), Israel, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom ab-
stained.64 The United States felt it was premature to speak in terms of legal 
rules governing economic relations and, hence, could not support the Decla-
ration.65 Without the support of many prominent economic powers, the extent 
of the Declaration's effect and influence is questionable. White provides a prag-
matic assessment, stating, "[r]ather, the virtue of these instruments lies in the 
fact that they have brought both the plight and the power of the developing 
countries to the attention of the Western industrial States."66 
62 United Nations Industrial Development Organization: Lima Declaration and Plan of Action on 
Industrial Development and Cooperation (Mar. 26. 1975). reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 826-44 (1975) [here-
inafter cited as Lima Declaration]. 
63 Dorsey. Preferential Treatment: A New Standard for International Economic Relations. 18 HARV. INT'L 
L.J. III (1977). 
64 White. supra note 21. at 340. 
65Id. at 341. 
66 Id. 
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2. The Content of the Lima Declaration and Nature of Obligations Created 
While the Lima Declaration flows directly from the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States, its focus is far more narrow. The Declaration is 
intended to address one area, industrial development, wherein the goals of the 
NIEO could be advanced. The initial paragraph of the document sets the stage 
for establishing the main principles of industrialization and defining the means 
by which the international community as a whole might take action of a broad 
nature in the field of industrial development within the framework of new 
forms of international cooperation, with a view to the establishment of a new 
international economic order.67 
The Declaration has the potential to add specificity to the general principles 
laid down by the Charter. The introductory section, however, suggests that this 
potential will not be realized. 
At the time, the political climate obviously was charged. The Lima Declaration 
condemned apartheid and neocolonialism68 in a way that bore little effect on the 
supposed focus of the conference. Further, an anti-Western bias is especially 
evident in the section dealing with transnational corporations: 
[T]he situation in the developing countries has become aggravated 
by the persistent and marked tensions to which the present inter-
national economic situation is subjected and that to these must be 
added as well the unacceptable practices of those transnational cor-
porations that infringe [sic] the principles of sovereignty of devel-
oping countries .... 69 
Beginning with section 23 of the Declaration, a "common position and line 
of action" is spelled out. An interesting feature of this section, and much of the 
balance of the Declaration, is the concern expressed for the "least developed 
countries." Thus, three strata are acknowledged: developed; developing; and 
least developed.70 Often, a general principle is stated in the Declaration about 
the treatment that the developing countries should receive. This is then modi-
67 Lima Declaration, supra note 62, at para. I. 
58 [d. at para. 9. 
69 [d. at para. 10. 
70 In the context of such discussions, countries are labeled as "developed", "developing", and "least 
developed". The degree of economic sophistication of each country may be represented by a sliding 
scale although often it is difficult to clearly delineate between developing and least developed countries. 
This latter term (and arguably, the middle term) refers to Third World countries of diverse political 
structures which share unfortunate characteristics such as widespread poverty, slow industrial growth 
coupled with low technology and capital levels, excessive population growth, uneven income distri-
bution, and low agricultural production. See NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: A THIRD WORLD 
PERSPECTIVE 3 (P. Ghosh ed. 1984); MANSFIELD, PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 512-21 (2d ed. 1977). 
See also infra note 87. 
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fied with "in particular the least developed countries."71 This parallels the ap-
proach taken in the Charter except that fewer gradations are stipulated. 
Of course, the points made in this "common position" section vary greatly; 
some are vague or irrelevant. Other points, however, do create obligations (both 
firm and tangible): 
That countries, particularly developed countries, should undertake 
an objective and critical examination of their present policies and 
make appropriate changes in such policies so as to facilitate the 
expansion and diversification of imports from developing countries 
and thereby make possible international economic relations on a 
rational, just and equitable basis.72 
[The LDCs' share of world industrial production] should be in-
creased to the maximum possible extent and as far as possible to at 
least 25 percent of the total world industrial production by the year 
2000, while making every endeavor to ensure that the industrial 
growth so achieved is distributed among the developing countries 
as evenly as possible.73 
Both of the above statements are diluted by the oft-found "should." The first 
statement amounts to little more than a call for soul-searching, especially on the 
part of the developed countries. The second provision is more significant. The 
desired increase to 25 percent in the LDCs' share of world industrial production 
is huge. It implies either a very large growth in total production or LDCs' gains 
at the expense of present producers. One wonders how the even distribution 
sought here can be reconciled with other provisions seeking preferential treat-
ment for the "least developed countries." These goals seem wildly optimistic. 
Surely, they have not been approached since the Declaration was approved. 
Several important provisions in this section caused difficulty for developed 
states. Nationalization of foreign-owned property is expressly permitted with no 
mention of an international legal standard for compensation.74 The needs of 
the least developed countries are specifically addressed, although with the ever 
present "should." For example, paragraph 35 states that the least developed 
countries "should enjoy a net transfer of resources from the developed countries 
in the form of technical and financial resources as well as capital goods .... "75 
Similarly, paragraph 36 provides that "[those] developing countries with suffi-
cient means at their disposal should give careful consideration to the possibility 
71 Lima Declaration, supra note 62, at para. 23-24. 
72 [d. at para. 27 (emphasis added). 
73 [d. at para. 28. 
74 [d. at para. 32. 
75 [d. at para. 35. 
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of ensuring a net transfer for financial and technical resources to the least 
developed countries."76 
One of the most straightforward sections of the Declaration concerns pro-
ducers' associations. The motivation here is the LDCs' belief that they have been 
abused by the developed countries. The LDCs "must undertake joint action to 
strengthen their negotiating position .... "77 
For this purpose, the developing countries must consider all possible 
means of strengthening the action of producers' associations already 
established, encourage the creation of other associations for the 
principal commodities exported by them, and establish a mechanism 
for consultation and cooperation among the various producers' as-
sociations .... 78 
In an OPEC-weary world, such provisions generate mixed feelings. 
The second half of the Declaration purports to set forth a "Plan of Action." 
The first subsection, entitled "Measures of National Scope," is a curious lecture 
to the developing countries telling them how to industrialize. For example, 
"[s]ound economic policies to assure economic stability and facilitate adequate 
domestic savings rates commensurate with industrial development objectives" 
are encouraged.79 Of course, there can be no argument that this should be 
done. The real issue is how to accomplish it. 
Along these same lines, section 59 lists those actions that should be taken by 
the developed countries. Some of the more important provisions of section 59 
are: progressive elimination, or reduction, of tariff and nontariff barriers;80 
increased financial contributions to international organizations, government and 
credit institutions in the developing countries to promote or finance industrial 
development;81 expanded technical assistance programs to benefit developing 
countries;82 and assistance to developing countries in raising the competitiveness 
of their production from natural raw materials.83 In general, such provisions 
are not startling. The provisions create obligations that are fairly tangible, but 
their firmness is diluted in many ways. 
The subsequent section of the Declaration deals with cooperation among 
developing countries. A number of measures that "should" be adopted are 
discussed. Direct trade is to be promoted "in order to substantially improve the 
76Id. at para. 36. 
77 Id. at para. 47. 
78 Id. (emphasis added). 
79Id. at para. 59(j). 
80Id. at para. 59(a). 
81 /d. at para. 59(e). 
82/d. at para. 59(£). 
8' Id. at para. 59(i). 
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share of developing countries in international trade in finished products .... "84 
It is suggested that "main producers and exporters of basic raw materials" 
among the developing countries grant "favorable conditions" to the least de-
veloped countries. Similarly, the more affluent developing countries are ad-
monished "to share in the economic and social development efforts of the least 
advanced countries. "85 Finally, the "industrialized developing countries" are 
supposed to give "preference" to imports from the less industrialized coun-
tries.86 Two impressions stand out here. First, the effort to get the developing 
countries to assist the least developed countries is weak, probably reflecting the 
feeling that the developing countries simply do not have the resources to provide 
significant assistance. Second, such provisions depend heavily on firm definitions 
of the subcategories of developing countries. These definitions have not been 
formulated comprehensively; instead they change markedly according to con-
text. 87 
Part III of the Plan of Action deals with cooperation between developed and 
developing countries and, not surprisingly, is more meaningful. The entire 
section sets forth the various kinds of preference that the LDCs are seeking. 
The hope is that there will be "[a]pplication, expansion and improvement of 
the schemes under the generalized system of preferences .... "88 It is the goal 
of this provision that the LDCs will experience a "substantial increase in their 
foreign exchange earnings .... "89 The remainder of these provisions generally 
are less significant, but several stipulations are notable. The developed countries 
are expected to increase their "actual transfer of resources" so that the LDCs 
can "sustain the growth effort essential for accelerating their social and economic 
development."9o Perhaps the height of naivete in the document is the following: 
The credits granted by the financing institutions of the industrial-
ized countries and international organizations to the deVeloping 
countries must be completely free of any kind of political conditions 
and should involve no economic conditions other than those nor-
mally required of borrowers.9! 
Finally, this section repeats the call for "an international code of conduct" for 
the transfer of technology.92 A code has been drafted by UNCTAD but it has 
84Id. at para. 60(a). 
85 Id. at para. 60(g). 
86Id. at para. 60(1). 
87 For a discussion of LDC subcategories, see UNITAR, supra note 28, at 24-35, and Annex I, at 
161. 
88 Lima Declaration, supra note 62, at para. 61(a). 
89Id. at para. 61(b). 
90 !d. at para. 61(e). 
91Id. at para. 61(f). 
92 !d. at para. 61 (m). 
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no legal force. 93 Such a document has great potential because it would have to 
confront certain issues that have been side-stepped in a more general context. 
The final two sections of the Declaration deal with the least developed coun-
tries and with institutional arrangements. "The least developed, land-locked 
arid island developing countries present a set of problems which require special 
measures .... "94 Concrete measures listed include: 
Specific, urgent measures to establish the necessary conditions for 
industrialization [;)95 
The establishment and financing of complete industrial estates and 
pilot plants[;]96 
The creation of integrated production units such as agricultural 
machinery plants[;]97 
Preferential treatment within the context of international agree-
ments for industrial products and processed commodities from 
these countries [;]98 
Special aid and assistance to the least developed, land-locked and 
island developing countries in the establishment and development 
of adequate means of transport and communications[.]99 
These provisions are some of the most tangible found in such documents. 
Still lacking, though, are adequately firm commitments and better definitions 
of subcategories of deVeloping countries. For example, the "should" remains in 
most cases. It is easy to envision a scenario where a developing coUntry avoids 
a commitment simply by contending that it is not an "industrialized developing 
country." 
The final section deals with institutional arrangements. It Was suggested in 
the Declaration that the United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
play the lead role in NIEO activities within the U.N. As requested in the 
Declaration, UNIDO should be provided with the resources and autonomy 
needed to do this job, 100 and should become a specialized agency of the U.N .101 
A proposed structure of UNIDO as a specialized agency is outiined.102 
9' UNCTAD, Draft International Code on Conduct on the Transfer of Technology of 12 May 1981, 
TD/CODE TOT 33. 
94 Lima Declaration, supra note 62, at para. 69. 
95 [d. at para. 62(a). 
96 /d. at para. 62(b). 
97 [d. at para. 62(c). 
98 [d. at para. 62(h). 
99 [d. at para. 62(i). 
iOO /d. at para. 68. 
101 /d. at para. 69. The Socialist states opposed specialized agency status on the grounds that it would 
weaken its effectiveness as a control coordinating body and upset the balance within the U.N. system. 
See Report of the 2nd General Conference, UNIDO, I.D.lConf. 3/31, at 40. 
i02 United Nations Conference on the Establishment of the United Nations Industrial Development 
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The final section of the Declaration can be viewed in two ways. It may be 
seen as a genuine attempt to address important problems by creating the proper 
organizational framework within the U.N. system. The cynic might argue, how-
ever, that NIEO functions could be handled equally well in other fora. Rather 
than furthering the Declaration's goals, the creation of a specialized agency 
might be yet another example of a bureaucracy trying to increase its power, size 
and influence. 
C. LOME Conventions 
1. Context and Background 
There have been three Lome Conventions joining the states of the European 
Economic Community and a group of African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries 
[hereinafter the ACP states]. Lome I entered into force in 1975103 followed by 
Lome II in 1980104 and Lome III in 1985.105 The Lome II and III Conventions 
and accompanying protocols are very detailed and intricate. For the purposes 
here, only a few of the more significant provisions from the Conventions will 
be discussed. The importance of these treaties is clear, since they obligate a 
large number of states106 to concrete NIEO-relevant conduct; the obligations 
are both firm and tangible}07 
Organization as a Specialized Agency, adopted on April 8, 1979, in Vienna, the Constitution of 
UNIDO. See U.N. Doc. AlCONF.90/19, reprinted in 18 LL.M. 667 (1979). The Constitution entered 
into force on June 21,1985. See 24 LL.M. 1748 (1985). 
103 European Economic Community - African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries: Lome I Conven-
tion, done at Lome, Togo, Feb. 28, 1975, reprinted in 14 LL.M. 595-642 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 
Lome I]. 
104 European Economic Community - African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries: Lome II Conven-
tion, done at Lome, Togo, Oct. 31, 1979, reprinted in 19 LL.M. 341-77 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 
Lome II]. 
105 European Economic Community - African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries: Lome III Con-
vention, done at Lome, Togo, Dec. 8, 1984, reprinted in 24 LL.M. 571-652 (1985) [hereinafter cited 
as Lome III]. 
106 The following are parties: (a) the European Economic Community (EEC) states - Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany (FRG), France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain and the 
United Kingdom; (b) the ACP states - Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, 
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Camoros, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, St. 
Christopher and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principle, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somali, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, 
Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, Upper Volta, Vanuatu, Western Samoa, Zaire, Zambia 
lind Zimbabwe. Id. at 574, 575. 
107 Provisions of Lome I and Lome II are analyzed by Hasenpflug, The Stabilimtion of Export Earnings 
in the Lome Convention: A Model Case? in THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (Sauvant & 
Hasenpflug, eds. 1977). See also Perrott, EEC Attitudes and Responses to the New International Economic 
Order, IlIA ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.F. 115 (1984). 
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One is struck by the fact that Lome provisions seem more definite and far 
less equivocal than is the case with most other documents dealing with the 
NIEO. This reflects several underlying factors including the unique political 
and economic cohesion of the European Economic Community, the former 
colonial status of many ACP states and the relatively smaller number of partic-
ipants. 
2. Provisions of Lome II and III and Nature of Obligations Created 
Since Lome II is briefer and less intricate than Lome III, it gives a clearer 
picture of the salient features of the Lome system. This section focuses princi-
pally on Lome II but also incorporates important changes occurring in Lome 
III. The introductory portion of the Lome II Convention sets both the tone 
and goals: 
ANXIOUS to reinforce, on the basis of complete equality between 
partners and in their mutual interest, close and continuing coop-
eration in a spirit of international solidarity; 108 
RESOLVED to continue and intensify their efforts to establish a 
model for relations between developed and developing States which 
is compatible with the aspirations of the international Community 
towards the establishment of a new, more just and more balanced 
international economic order; 109 
DESIROUS of safeguarding the interests of the ACP States whose 
economies depend to a considerable extent on the export of com-
modities and of developing their resources. IIO 
The first major section of the Convention, Title I, deals with Trade Coop-
eration. The stated goal of the Convention is to further trade between the ACP 
states and the Community, while considering their respective levels of devel-
opment. 1l1 Significant concessions are granted to the ACP states. Where prod-
ucts originate in ACP states, they shall be imported into the Community free 
of customs duties and similar charges. 112 Furthermore, the Community shall 
not apply quantitative restrictions or similar measures to products imported 
from ACP states. ll3 Some protection is offered, however, lest certain imports 
create too much of a burden: 
The provisions of Article 3 shall not preclude prohibitions or re-
strictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds 
108 Lome II, supra note 104, at Preamble. 
109 !d. 
110Id. 
111 !d. at art. 1. 
112Id. at art. 2. 
113Id. at art. 3. 
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of public morality, public policy or public security; the protection 
of health and life of humans, animals and plants; the protection of 
national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archeological value 
or the protection of industrial and commercial property.1I4 
This article is curious. It seems completely reasonable except for the inclusion 
of "public policy" which can be construed to include all manner of things. 
Additional safeguards are provided. 1I5 Overall, one has the impression that 
these are minor in nature and will not be abused. In the final portion of Title 
I, measures for promoting trade are enumerated. These are to be implemented 
"from the production stage to the final stage of distribution."116 Specific actions 
envisioned include management and vocational training, market research, trade 
data exchange, and greater cooperation between economic operators. ll7 
The last portion of Title I is the first example of funding directed expressly 
at implementing the provisions. liB This is highly significant because it provides 
for the kind of tangible commitment lacking in many NIEO documents. Al-
though the 40,000,000 EUAII9 may be inadequate, it represents a quantum leap 
beyond most other "obligations." 
The next section of the Convention, Title II, deals with export earnings from 
commodities. Again a specific and sizeable amount of money, 550,000,000 EUA, 
is set aside to cover all commitments incurred under the section. 120 An elaborate 
system is created whereby a reference level is calculated for each product's ACP 
state. l2l A trigger mechanism is established so that ACP states can request 
payments if the money they earn during a year falls 6.5 per cent or more below 
the reference level. 122 Article 41 provides less flexibility by requiring states 
receiving funds under this provision to explain "the probable use" to which the 
monies will be pUt. 123 
Title III discusses Mineral Products. A separate section was necessary due to 
the current status of the ACP states whose economies are largely dependent on 
the mining sectors. In particular, ACP states need help coping with a decline in 
both their capacity to export mining products to the Community and in their 
export earnings. 124 
II4Id. at art. 5. 
ll5Id. at art. 12. 
II6Id. at art. 20. 
ll7 Id. at art. 21. 
lIB Id. at art. 22. 
II9 Originally, the EVA was equal to about $1.00 V.S., but its value has been allowed to fluctuate. 
120 Lome II, supra note 104, at art. 31. 
121 Id. at art. 36. 
122Id. at art. 37. 
123Id. at art. 41. 
124/d. at art. 49. 
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Again, money is provided to carry out the intent of this section. A "special 
financing facility" was established with the EEC contributing 280,000,000 EVA 
for its operation. 125 ACP states could seek assistance below a certain set level. 
Provisions also call for the Community to provide technical and financial assis-
tance with mining operations in the ACP states. 126 There is, however, no spec-
ificity about the amount of that assistance, not unlike the "loose" obligations of 
other documents. Similarly, Title IV, Investments, calls on Community members 
to strive to implement measures that will encourage investment in industrial 
development. 127 It is unlikely that Title IV produced any action that would not 
have occurred without the Convention. 
Titles V and VI deal, respectively, with industrial and agricultural coopera-
tion. Both establish firm obligations for the Community, such as providing 
effective assistance in the evaluation of needs and the execution of appropriate 
schemes. 128 In the agricultural area, very specific measures are mandated. "Rural 
cooperation schemes" will be begun with the ACP states determining their 
priorities. 129 Also, a "Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation" 
with very specific functions is to be created. 130 
Probably the most complex section of the Convention is Title VII, Financial 
and Technical Cooperation. "The objective of financial and technical coopera-
tion shall be to promote the economic and social development of the ACP States 
on the basis of the priorities laid down by those States and in the mutual interest 
of the parties."131 The bulk of the Community'S current financial assistance is 
allocated for activities described in this section: 
2,928 million EVA in the form of grants; 
504 million EVA in the form of special loans; 
208 million EVA in the form of risk capital. 132 
In some ways the most important provisions are contained in the innocuous-
looking Title VII: General provisions concerning the least developed, land-
locked and island ACP states. Here the "least developed ACP States"133 are 
listed. This makes the entire Convention much more meaningful because it 
eliminates any misunderstanding about the applicability of certain provisions. 
125Id. at art. 51. 
1261d. at art. 57. 
1271d. at art. 60. 
1281d. at art. 68. 
1291d. at art. 85. 
130 !d. at art. 88. 
m !d. at art. 91.l. 
132Id. at art. 95.1a. Lome III provides for increased financial assistance, the relevant figures being: 
4,860 million EUA in the form of grants, 600 million EUA in the form of special loans. 600 million 
EUA in the form of risk capital. Lome III, supra note 105, at art. 194. 
m Lome II, supra note 104, at art. 155.3. 
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Thus, a loophole that often can thwart the operation of norms of conduct is 
avoided. 
Lome III represents an incremental change from Lome II. At the most 
fundamental level, participation has somewhat broadened. There are now 64 
ACP participants and the Republic of Greece is participating as a new member 
of the European Economic Community.134 Since the three Lome Conventions 
will extend for a period of 15 years (1975-1990), they do provide an opportunity 
to assess the development and maturation of the NIEO. A good example of 
this development is seen in Chapter 1 (Cultural and Social Dimension) of Lome 
III. This section states in uncertain terms that development programs "shall be 
based on understanding of, and regard for, the cultural and social features of 
the milieu."135 Further in the Chapter, special social and cultural factors that 
must be considered in the implementation of all programs are enumerated. 
These factors include the "status and role of women ... , types of social and 
interpersonal relationships,"136 and the "adaptation to the cultural milieu and 
the implications of that milieu ... , integration and enhancement of the local 
cultural heritage."137 
Of course, one could argue that these provisions are nebulous and vague. 
Who is to say what the cultural milieu is? But such stipulations within a broader 
instrument acknowledge that a component of the NIEO is the right of devel-
oping states to influence not just the magnitude, but also the mode and char-
acteristics of development assistance. It is to be expected that specific foci of 
Lome Convention efforts will shift according to the most pressing needs. In 
Lome III, fisheries 138 and transport and communications139 have received more 
concentrated attention. The fisheries title is especially far-reaching. It acknowl-
edges that the principles from the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the 
Sea must be applied. 140 A careful balance is struck between the interests of ACP 
and EEC states. EEC states agree to pay "[p]articular attention" to "the training 
of ACP nationals in all areas of fisheries .... "141 In exchange for providing this 
technology and assistance, EEC members' fishing vessels are assured "a role ... 
operating lawfully in waters under ACP jurisdiction."142 Additionally, it is ac-
knowledged that ACP coastal states will be compensated for foreign fishing. 143 
134 See supra note 106. 
135 Lome IiI, supra note 105, at art. 116.1. 
1361d. at art. 117.a. 
137 ld. at art. 117.b. 
138 /d. at tit. II, arts. 50-59. 
139/d. at arts. 84-94. 
140ld. at art. 50. 
141 ld. at art. 53. 
142Id. at art. 55. 
1431d. at art. 59. 
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The care with which the instrument was crafted suggests that both parties share 
a common expectation about what fair compensation will be. On balance, it 
seems that Lome III is the most demonstrative and successful example of NIEO 
aspirations being put into practice. 
No arrangements comparable to Lome II and Lome III have been established 
between Socialist and developing countries. The Council of Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA), a Socialist counterpart of the EEC, lacks the supranational 
capacity to be a meaningful framework for the multilateral actions of the So-
cialist states vis-a-vis the LDCs. Socialist relations with the Third World are 
predominantly bilateral. Further, as a rule, the agreements on economic coop-
eration between CMEA and developing countries do not provide for prefer-
ential treatment but "are based on principles of equality and mutual benefit."144 
Such a practice reflects the Socialist position of non-responsibility for this under-
development, a position firmly established since UNCTAD I.145 The fact that 
the Socialist states have been unwilling or unable to take similar stepsl46 amplifies 
the significance of Lome II and III in terms of tangibility and firmness. 
D. The Convention Adopted by the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea l47 
1. Background and Context 
On April 30, 1982, the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea adopted 
the text of a new and comprehensive Convention on the Law of the Sea. 148 On 
December 9, 1984, the closing date for signatl!re, 159 countries appended 
signatures. 149 Of course, the hurdle of ratification remains, along with strident 
U.S. resistance that may continue at least through the second Reagan admin-
istration. This document, however, provides an excellent example of the forces 
144 CMEA Secretariat, "Cooperation of the CMEA member countries and the CMEA with developing 
countries," (1982), UNITAR, supra note 28, at 46-48. 
145 During UNCTAD I, a Soviet delegate stated, "we are in no way responsible for the serious 
economic consequences which colonial domination or the policy of neo-colonialism has involved for 
the developing countries, ... it is therefore unnatural and unrealistic to try to adopt the same approach 
to the developed capitalist countries and the Socialist countries." UNCTAD I, supra note 8, vol. II, at 
535. 
146 As to the measures undertaken by the COMECON, see Butler, Socialist International Institutions 
and the New International t;conomic Order, IlIA ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.F. 149 (1984); P. AGARWALA, THE 
NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: AN OVERVIEW 208-15 (1983). 
147 Portions of this section are adapted from a longer version that appeared in 6 Loy. L.A. INT'L & 
COMPo L.J. 65 (1983). 
148 19 U.N. CHRONICLE 3 (1982) (vote of 130 for, 4 against, and 25 abstentions). The Convention 
was opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982. Reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, THE LAW OF THE SEA: UNITED 
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, U.N. Pub. Sales No. E.83.V.5 [hereinafter cited as 
Convention]. It was originally signed by 119 signatories. Their list appears in 21 I.L.M. 1477 (1982). 
An additional 15 signatories appear at 23 I.L.M. 235 (1984). 
149 24 I.L.M. 268 (1985). States that signed included 51 from Africa, 30 from Latin America, 10 
from Eastern Europe and 23 from Western Europe. 
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advocating for the NIEO manifested in an important international legal forum. 
The text adopted is massive, containing 320 articles and 9 annexes. Presented 
below is a classification of some of the tteaty's textual material that bears on the 
NIEO. 
2. Content of the Law of the Sea Convention and Nature of Obligations 
Created 
The provisions of the Convention suggest five categories into which material 
dealing with the NIEO might be placed. These categories correspond to the 
means by which the NIEO can be advanced. I50 The five categories used here 
are: (1) general appeals, based on the moral right of the cause, but not man-
dating specific action; (2) provisions that penalize the more technologically 
advanced states; (3) provisions that give special preferences (usually economic) 
to developing states; (4) special privileges for certain subcategories of developing 
states; and (5) provisions on the transfer of technology from developed to 
developing countries. 
3. General Appeals 
It is problematic whether these provisions represent any victory for the NIEO. 
Such provisions do not carry the force of law; in fact, they fail even to list 
specific desired courses of action. One example is in the preamble to the Con-
vention, which discusses the ideological balance that must be struck in dealing 
with the NIEO. 
[T]he achievement of such goals will contribute to the realizatio~ of 
a just and equitable international economic order which would take 
into account the interests and needs of mankind as a whole and, in 
particular, the special interests and needs of developing countries, 
whether coastal or land-locked. I51 
It seems that developing states were able to substitute "equitable" for "new" as 
the adjective describing the desired economic order. Consideration of the in-
terests of humanity as a whole, along with special attention to the LDCs, seems 
comparable to the dilemma the United States is faced with when reconciling 
affirmative action and equal opportunity. It remains an open question whether 
150 Another approach, not adopted here, is to look at NIEO references as they apply to substantive 
areas of the Convention, for example, fisheries, scientific research, deep sea bed mining, etc., or to 
analyze the competing claims of developed and developing nations in various maritime zones. See 
Boczek, Ideolo/5Y and the Law of the Sea: The Challenge of the New International Economic Ortier, 7 B.C. 
INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 1 (1984). 
151 Convention, supra note 148, at Preamble. 
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this general expression of sentiments will be effected through the specific pro-
visions of the Convention. 
Part XI of the Convention contains several "general appeals" statements. For 
example, Article 155 establishes a review conference, the purpose of which is 
to assess the first 15 years of operation of the regime. 152 A primary purpose of 
that review will be to determine whether the goals of the NIEO are being 
advanced: 
The Review Conference shall ensure the maintenance of the prin-
ciple of the common heritage of mankind, the international regime 
designed to ensure equitable exploitation of the resources of the 
area for the benefit of all countries, especially the developing States 
153 
4. Provisions that "Penalize" Technology 
Unlike the sweeping nature of the general appeals, the other four categories 
of materials represent variants on the same theme, to wit, if one accepts the 
general view that the NIEO must be supported, what specific methods are to 
be used? One approach is to penalize those countries with a technological edge, 
and in effect, neutralize some of the advantage they enjoy. A good example is 
transit passage through straits. The Convention provides that "foreign ships, 
including marine scientific research and hydrographic survey ships, may not 
carry out any research or survey activities without the prior authorization of 
the States bordering the straits."154 Developing countries border the most straits, 
however, the developed states transit the straits most frequently. Thus, this 
provision can be viewed as an attempt to control the excesses of technology 
possessed by the developed countries, for it is the exploitative potential of these 
excesses which the LDC states fear. 
An interesting set of compromises was reached in the Convention concerning 
rights to the sea floor adjacent to a state but at a distance beyond 200 nautical 
miles from the coast. Of course, it is almost exclusively the developed states that 
will have the technology to conduct such operations either off their own coasts 
or in joint ventures off the coasts of developing states. The Convention reads: 
The payments and contributions shall be made annually with respect 
to all production at a site after the first five years of production at 
that site. For the sixth year, the rate of payment or contribution 
shall be 1 percent of the value or volume of production at the site. 
152 Id. at art. 155. 
153 /d. See also art. 150, which states that "[aJctivities in the Area shall ... be carried out ... for the 
over-all development of all countries, especially developing states .... " /d. at art. 150. 
154Id. at art. 40. 
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The rate shall increase by 1 percent for each subsequent year until 
the twelfth year and shall remain at 7 percent thereafter. 155 
Both of these examples call for concessions from those who have the technology 
to carry out sophisticated activities such as scientific research or petroleum 
extraction. Such "penalizing" provisions may inhibit the use of those technolo-
gies which, in the case of the sea floor example, would mean that no contribution 
would be made. Both provisions, however, are much less stringent than might 
have been the case. 
5. Providing Special Economic Preferences for LDCs 
The distinction between "taxing" technology and providing a special economic 
advantage to developing states may be hard to draw. It is the latter (and more 
positive) approach that is more common in the Convention. One of the clearest 
examples of giving an economic preference to the LDCs can be seen in the 
operative provisions existing when a state cannot harvest all the fish in its 200-
mile exclusive economic zone. When a coastal state does not have the capacity 
to harvest all the fish in its zone, it shall "give other States access to the surplus 
... having particular regard to the provisions of articles 69 and 70, especially 
in relation to the developing States mentioned herein."156 The intent of the 
drafters is clarified later where it is enumerated that one of the specific criteria 
for granting access to excess catch is to be "the nutritional needs of the popu-
lations of the respective States."157 
It is to be expected that pollution control is an area where special economic 
advantages would be demanded by the LDCs. What is surprising is the degree 
to which the Convention states the case explicitly: "Developing States shall, for 
the purposes of prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine 
environment or minimization of its effects, be granted preference by interna-
tional organizations in: (a) the allocation of appropriate funds and technical 
assistance; and (b) the utilization of their specialized services."158 
6. Special Treatment for Certain Categories of LDCs 
It has been clear for decades that the LDCs are not a monolith; they differ 
greatly in size, resources and ideology. During the Third U.N. Conference on 
the Law of the Sea, this fact had to be accommodated, especially with regard to 
the Area (Part XI). Since the economies of certain developing countries are 
155 !d. at art. 82(2). 
156 !d. at art. 62(2). 
157 [d. at art. 70(3)(d). 
158 !d. at art. 203. 
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heavily dependent on the same minerals which are extracted from the deep 
seabed, the economic effects of mining could be disastrous. Thus, this group 
of LDCs is singled out for special treatment. 
Upon the recommendation of the Council on the basis of advice 
from the Economic Planning Commission, the Assembly shall estab-
lish a system of compensation or take other measures of economic 
adjustment assistance including cooperation with specialized agen-
cies and other international organizations to assist developing coun-
tries which suffer serious adverse effects on their export earnings 
or economies resulting from a reduction in the price of an affected 
mineral or in the volume of exports of that mineral, to the extent 
that such reduction is caused by activities in the Area. IS9 
Similar concern was not expressed for the economies of developed countries. 
This is, however, the fundamental purpose of the NIEO. Such special privileges 
are not limited to the Area. In regard to the continental shelf beyond 200 
nautical miles, developing states may, under certain circumstances, be exempt 
from the tax that must be paid: "A developing State which is a net importer of 
a mineral resource produced from its continental shelf is exempt from making 
such payments or contributions in respect to that mineral resource."160 The fact 
that the diversity of LDCs was accommodated in these provisions shows a certain 
maturity among NIEO proponents, especially in comparison to some of the 
categories already dealt with. 
7. Transfer of Technology 
A basic assumption behind the NIEO is the notion that the LDCs do not want 
charity. These countries would prefer to be given the tools and the training 
needed to modernize and develop themselves. Since the mid-1960s, in the 
context of the law of the sea, these sentiments have been voiced under the 
rubric of the transfer of technology. It is, therefore, not surprising that many 
provisions of the Convention deal with technology transfer. 
For example, the Authority that will manage the deep seabed is entrusted 
with significant responsibilities for transfer of technology both to the developing 
states and to the enterprise, the organ of the authority that will actually engage 
in mining. The Authority and States Parties will initiate and promote: 
The transfer to developing States of such technology and scientific 
knowledge so that all States' Parties benefit therefrom. 161 
159Id. at art. 151(10). 
160 !d. at art. 82(3). 
161Id. at art. 144(l)(b). 
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. . . Programmes for the transfer of technology to the Enterprise 
and to developing States with regard to activities in the Area, in-
cluding, inter alia, facilitating the access of the Enterprise and of 
developing States to the relevant technology, under fair and reason-
able terms and conditions; 162 
... [M]easures directed towards the advancement of the technology 
of the Enterprise and the domestic technology of the Enterprise 
and the domestic technology of developing States, particularly by 
providing opportunities to personnel from the Enterprise and from 
developing States for training in marine science and technology and 
for their full participation in activities in the Area. 163 
Similar provisions exist concerning the preservation and protection of the ma-
rine environment. 164 
A somewhat less likely place to find technology transfer provisions is in Part 
XIII dealing with marine scientific research. Certain provisions here may inter-
fere with scientists' ability to conduct research. For example, Art. 244.2 states 
that: 
For this purpose, States, both individually and in cooperation with 
other States and with competent international organizations, shall 
actively promote the flow of scientific data and information and the 
transfer of knowledge resulting from marine scientific research ca-
pabilities of developing States through, inter alia, programmes to 
provide adequate education and training of their technical and 
scientific personnel. I65 
It is not surprising that marine scientists object not so much to the spirit of such 
provisions but to the ways in which they may be interpreted. Scientists are 
understandably sensitive about research results being disseminated piecemeal, 
prematurely, or taken out of context. All of these events are possible, given 
various interpretations of these provisions. 
An entire section of the Convention is devoted to the development and 
transfer of marine technology (Part XIV).I66 Of course, there are a number of 
16. [d. at art. l44(2)(a). 
16' [d. at art. l44(2)(b). 
164 [d. at art. 202. 
165 [d. at art. 244(2). 
166 The umbrella for the rest of the section is this: 
States should promote the development of the marine scientific and technological capacity of 
States which may need and request technical assistance in this field, particularly developing 
States, including land-locked and geographically disadvantaged States, with regard to the 
exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of marine resources, the protection 
and preservation of the marine environment, marine scientific research and other activities 
in the marine environment compatible with this Convention, with a view to accelerating the 
social and economic development of the developing States. [d. at art. 266(2). 
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different ways in which the general provisions in this section might be imple-
mented. States are required to promote "the acquisition, evaluation and dissem-
ination of marine technological knowledge and facilitate access to such infor-
mation and data."167 States are also required to "establish programmes of 
technical cooperation .... "168 An open question is how thorough and genuine 
such measures would be. It is possible to follow the letter of the provisions and 
still do nothing significant in the transfer of technology. 
The length and complexity of this Convention provides the opportunity for 
numerous kinds of responses to NIEO issues within a context that was not 
focused principally on the NIEO per se. The range of provisions is great, from 
platitudes, neither firm, nor tangible, to the provisions dealing with the Area, 
both firm and tangible. A basic issue with this convention (and one that could 
be sidestepped with both the Charter and the Lima Declaration) is whether the 
Convention has been so demonstrative about NIEO issues that it will never 
obtain the required 60 ratifications and accessions to enter into force. The 
United States has already indicated firm opposition to the treaty.169 Some West 
European states have similar feelings, albeit expressed with more subtlety. All 
of the Socialist states have signed the treaty. 
III. ANALYSIS 
This section first analyzes NIEO documents in terms of international law 
sources. Then, the need for change versus economic reality is addressed. Finally, 
a scheme for evaluating the obligation created by NIEO documents is offered. 
A. The Sources of International Law 
It is instructive to analyze the international legal substance of the NIEO in 
terms of the three principal sources of international law; treaties, custom, and 
general principles recognized by civilized nations. This provides a more objective 
and critical perspective, removed from the political aspirations that color much 
of the rhetoric about the NIEO. 
1. "International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing 
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states."170 
The UNITAR study identified a huge amount of conventional international 
law dealing with the NIEO. Most of that law is bilateral or plurilateral, not 
167/d. at art. 268. 
168 I d. at art. 269. 
169 The U.S. position on the subject is well explained by Morton, The Law of the Sea and the New 
International Economic Order, IlIA ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.F. 13 (1984). 
170 STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 38. 
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general multilateral law. The provisions of the Lome II and III Conventions 
are exceptional in their firmness and completeness. Because NIEO issues are 
so basic to the political climate of the 1970's and 1980's, they are present to 
some degree in many treaties. But not a single general multilateral treaty exists 
in force, that deals principally with NIEO issues.l7I It is significant that the only 
firm and tangible rules relating to the NIEO occur in conventions between the 
Western states and the LDCs, e.g., Lome II and III. The overall impact of 
conventional law on the NIEO is difficult to assess because it is diverse, frag-
mented, and even contradictory. 
2. "International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law."172 
While the LDCs feel a crying need for a customary international law dealing 
with basic NIEO issues, serious problems have arisen in trying to assess prospects 
for such law. If one looks at the negotiations that have produced many of the 
most important NIEO documents, the impression is that certain states, in par-
ticular the U.S., feel their national interest demands avoiding any impression 
that basic NIEO issues are part of customary international law. For example, 
when the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was being drafted, 
the term "obligations" was changed to "provisions", 173 exactly the kind of change 
that thwarts the development of a rule of customary law. 
UNITAR has described the dilemma exactly: 
For, the most important ... problem involved is the question of 
verifying legally relevant manifestations of practice; that of proving 
the existence of opinio iuris underlying usus - since lack of the 
former prevents the latter from evolving into custom and the emer-
gence of a norm of customary law. What legal significance should one 
attach, for instance, to sudden exceptions to a hitherto consistent 
practice? Unless the reasons for the interruption are explained by 
the actor[s] in question, one may be left in doubt: just as even a 
highly consistent practice does not always have to result from cor-
responding opinio iuris .... Policy changes with respect to prefer-
ential treatment may result from purely political considerations, or 
be dictated by economic coercion .... 174 
I7l Arguably, however, the constituent instruments of certain international organizations may refute 
this. 
172 STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 28(J)(b). 
173 Brower, supra note 40, at 30 I. 
174 UNITAR, supra note 28, at 23. 
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3. "The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations."175 
One could point to the vast number of references to NIEO principles made 
in a myriad of fora as evidence that general principles of law are now recognized 
relative to the NIEO. But do general principles mean very much in an area like 
the NIEO where specific actions, usually preferential treatment, are needed? 
On the one hand, one might argue, as Dorsey has done, that the climate is 
important since formulations like the Charter and the Lima Declaration "add 
to the normative authority of previous statements attesting to the existence of 
a developing international law of cooperation in the sphere of economic rights 
and duties of states."176 By contrast, it is possible that general support assuages 
the need for specific action. 
One of the most intriguing and controversial issues of law-making in the 
NIEO context is the character of resolutions of international organizations. I77 
The LDCs, with their voting majority in the U.N. General Assembly tend to 
maintain that "these resolutions constitute at the very least the will of the 
international community"17S and "always have compulsory value, with regard 
both to the organization and to the States."179 The concept of the binding nature 
of some U.N. resolutions predates the NIEOISO but has gained momentum 
during the NIEO debates. The argument advanced by many Third World 
authors, that consensus rather than consent is becoming the basis of obligation 
in internationallaw,lsl was inspired by Professor Richard A. Falk. ls2 Falk viewed 
this shift as a necessity if "international society is to function effectively .... "IS3 
Not surprisingly, these ideas are generally opposed by both Socialist and West-
ern authorities. ls4 
The NIEO is an area where the operation of the sources of international law 
should be examined carefully. It is possible that the accumulation of many 
treaties dealing with the NIEO will help to establish customary law on these 
issues. ls5 This has been demonstrated in other areas, specifically status of forces 
I75 STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 38. 
176 Dorsey, supra note 63, at Ill. 
J77 See generally Ellis, supra note 3. 
178 M. BEDjAOUI, supra note 15, at 178-79. 
179Id. at 179. 
180 See, e.g" O. ASAMOAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
OF THE U.N. 66-67 (1966); Memon, U.N. Special Committee and Decolonization, 9 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 27 
(1969). 
181 See, e.g., Milan Bulajic and S.R. Chowdbury. See S. Chowdbury, Legal Status of the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 
79,84 (K. Hossain, ed. 1980). 
182 Falk, On the Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 785 (1966). 
I83Id. 
184 Tunkin, supra note 16, at 89-90; Tunkin, International Law in the International System, 147 RECUEIL 
DES COURS 62-71 (1978). 
185 See generally Gamble, The Treaty/Custom Dichotomy, 16 TEX. INT'L L.J. 309 (1981). 
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agreements. 186 It is clear that the NIEO is so politically charged that it will not 
spring easily and fully into the mainstream of international law as was the case, 
for example, with the continental shelf doctrine. 
B. The Need for Change v. Economic Reality 
It is maddeningly difficult to "get a fix" on the current status of the inter-
national law pertaining to the NIEO. Perceptions of the developing states are 
vastly different from those of the economic powers. Because such different 
perceptions exist, these two groups of countries are unclear about reality. One 
author illustrates the general conflict in the following terms: 
Their [the LDCs] long suppressed frustration had bubbled to the 
surface and burst. This produced an understandably defensive re-
action on the part of the developed countries, particularly in the 
United States. None of the developed countries was prepared to 
respond in depth to the detailed attack which cut so deeply into the 
established way of doing things. 187 
Garcia-Amador's views on the matter are cogent. He discusses the "emerging 
law of development" while acknowledging that "some of the basic principles of 
traditional international law have never been subjected to such far-reaching 
challenges."188 
An important question often is overlooked: If the LDCs were able to secure 
most of the concessions they seek, would it have a significant effect on their 
underlying problems? As it stands now, the developed states can use three 
distinct arguments or tactics to counter the claims of the LDCs: first, it is illegal; 
second, it is not in our national interest; and third, it will not work. The first 
two alone often can be countered. The third used in combination with either of 
the other two makes the case much stronger. 
Dorsey identifies three elements that make the LDCs' demands for prefer-
ential treatment less palatable to many developed countries: 
l.The right to preferential treatment does not seem to carry with it 
a corresponding obligation to benefit from the use of resources 
diverted to a country. 
2.0nce preferential treatment is granted to a developing country, 
there are no standards beyond those which a developed country 
might try to impose as a measure of the effective utilization of its 
benefits. The only sanction would be the forfeiture of the right to 
preferential treatment for failure to meet such standards. Such 
186 See Jordan, Creation Of Customary International Law By Way Of Treaty, 9 JAG L. REV. 38, 43 (1967). 
187 R. MEAGHER, supra note 4, at 5. 
188 Garcia-Amador, supra note 17, at 17. 
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an imposition would probably run afoul of the provision of the 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States .... 
3.Less onerous to national sovereignty might be an obligation to 
work towards eventual disqualification from the beneficiary posi-
tion of a developing country. The United States suggested the 
incorporation of such an obligation at the Lima Conference, but 
it was not adopted in the final deciaration. 189 
289 
All of these ideas reduce to a disagreement about the degree to which the 
LDCs should be accountable for assistance they receive. In many ways such 
requests seem only reasonable, surely not too much to pay for the concessions. 
However, the LDCs often view this demand for accountability as an extension 
of the colonialist mentality that, in their view, created most of these problems 
in the first place. Above all, NIEO issues must be viewed in many contexts, not 
just economics. No doubt the recent conservative shift of several major Western 
governments has made things more difficult for the NIEO. To cite one example, 
a Carter-like administration in the U.S. would have supported the Law of the 
Sea Convention even with its NIEO provisions. Furthermore, it is clear that the 
LDCs are experiencing a doctrinaire period while they adjust to their newly-
found power and status. It is tempting to speculate about the effect of the 
confluence of a less doctrinaire stance from the LDCs and more liberal govern-
ments in Britain, the United States, and elsewhere. 
C. A Scheme for Evaluating NIEO-Related Documents 
The vast number of legal documents having some bearing on the NIEO 
necessitates some system of classification. Otherwise it would be impossible to 
assess the overall status of law on the subject or to compare various documents. 
There can be great difficulty in agreeing on the definition of terms. UNITAR 
discussed rights, legal obligations, expectations, and political commitment. 19o 
Here, another approach is taken. The following can be used to assess the 
obligation created by NIEO documents: 
The idea behind the scheme employed in the table is simple. The obligation 
created by NIEO instruments should be assessed according to the substance 
and duration of the obligations to whom those obligations apply. Separate 
dimensions are used for the obligation itself. The first dimension deals with the 
nature of the obligation: (1) What is the source of the obligations; treaty, custom, 
general principles or U.N. resolutions? (2) How definite is the text of the 
obligation, for example, does it say "shall" or "should"? (3) How specific and 
concrete is the obligation? and (4) How long does the obligation last? The second 
189 Dorsey. supra note 63, at 130. 
190 UNITAR, supra note 28. at 20. 
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dimension deals with the applicability of the obligation: (1) How many states 
are obliged to follow the terms of the instrument? (2) Are the states involved 
needed for the operation of the obligation, for example, are the states that can 
give preferential treatment involved? and (3) Is participation envisioned, either 
actively or passively, by international organizations, or multinational corpora-
tions? 
A brief examination of the documents discussed earlier shows that each can 
be accommodated by this scheme. For example, Lome II and III create very 
firm and tangible obligations for a group of 75 states from West Europe and 
the Third World and they do so through the most definitive source, a treaty. 
Each Lome treaty created an obligation lasting for five years. In contrast, the 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (a resolution) created fairly 
firm obligations that tend to be intangible. These obligations may last for a long 
time but that matters little since they are intangible. The Charter has been 
accepted by most of the states in the world except for a few important ones, 
arguably the most important. The case of the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law 
of the Sea is very complicated. The treaty addresses so many different topics in 
a myriad of ways; thus, the firmness and tangibility are highly variable. The 
Convention may never enter into force. While 159 states have signed the in-
strument, thus far only 17 states have ratified or acceded to the treaty.191 Since 
60 parties are required for entry into force,192 the future is problematic. 
IV. A FINAL WORD 
Examining the current legal status of the NIEO leaves one with considerable 
disquietude. Demands are being made for rapid, substantial changes. It should 
be remembered that the "old" international economic system with its hallmarks 
of lowered (or no) tariffs, equal treatment, and most favored nation treatment, 
developed immediately after World War 11. 193 That system was not yet firmly 
in place when the onslaught of demands for fundamental changes began. The 
following illustrates how perceptions occur on totally different planes: 
Logically speaking, the foregoing construction of the old, almost 
venerable principle of the legal equality of States ... does not seem 
to be sound rationale for advocating that unequal and preferential 
treatment be given to countries in certain states of development. 
Indeed, the problem is not whether or not such a claim is compatible 
with the principle of the legal equality of States; since the purposes 
191 Up-to-date information kindly provided by the Treaty Division of the U.N. Secretariat. 
192 Convention, supra note 148, at art. 308. 
193 Dorsey, supra note 63, at 113. 
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of this principle have nothing to do with those of NIEO's postulates, 
this problem cannot even be raised. 194 
291 
The basic question must be the degree to which international law can play a 
positive role in assisting the LDCs in realizing their legitimate aspirations as 
advanced under the rubric of the NIEO. International law can lead and shape 
public policy, but it must do so carefully and subtly. International law can coax, 
cajole, and prod states into new channels of behavior and thought. When law 
is called upon to engineer a fundamental break with the past, however, it will 
fail utterly; the tenets and procedures of international law are simply too fragile. 
A good example is the Charter, where Article 2(2)(c), in its break with tra-
ditional international law, foreclosed the possibility that the United States would 
look favorably and flexibly on that document. 195 One wonders whether enlight-
ened self-interest would have led the LDCs toward a different position on 
2(2)(c). An ideal synthesis would be between the economic order developing 
after 1945, the thesis, and the understandable demand for changes pressed by 
the NIEO, the antithesis. But there are few signs for optimism unless (a) the 
world economy is healthy, (b) major Western powers become more sympathetic 
and flexible, and (c) the LDCs adopt a more reasonable posture about the 
changes they seek. In the view of many developed states, especially the United 
States, the demands of the LDCs are so extreme that they are beyond the pale 
of international law. Even if all three conditions are met, the NIEO will not 
become a global regime without Socialist participation. That participation is 
unlikely since the LDCs would want the same privileges granted by the Western 
states. Further, the Socialist states' desire to use the NIEO as a vehicle for 
revitalizing economic relations between East and West serves to complicate an 
already difficult political-legal situation. 196 
It would be very instructive to examine all NIEO documents according to the 
scheme described here. Under this scheme, one could determine, for example, 
the relation between the type of obligation and its applicability. Intuition sug-
gests that international political bargaining would require sacrificing tangibility 
and firmness in order to "buy" wider application. This leads to the quintessential 
normative question, is the sacrifice in the nature of the obligation a reasonable 
price to pay for greater participation?197 
19. Garcia-Amador, supra note 17, at 19. 
195 Id. at 51. 
196 B. Fomin, supra note 11, at 7-9. 
197 A parallel point can be made about reservations to multilateral treaties. See Gamble. Reservations 
to Multilateral Treaties: A Macroscopic View of State Practice, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 372-94 (1980). 
